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Abstract
We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can
choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network.
We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always
emerges, with most agents following the choice made by a few agents. We
find a suitable parameterisation which highlights the universal aspects of the
behaviour and which also indicates where results depend on the type of social
network.
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1. Introduction
The minority game is a simple model for competition dynamics that at-
tempts to explain the behaviour of a collection of agents competing for a
limited resource [1, 2, 3]. Traditionally, such games have been used to pro-
vide a simple platform for experimentation in financial market dynamics but
their applicability is far more general. Any situation in which it is beneficial
to be in the minority or to possess some information that few others possess
will exhibit characteristics inherent in the minority game.
In recent years, the study of large and complicated networks, such as
vast social networks or intricate genetic networks, has seen a huge rise in
popularity [4, 5, 6]. Partly this is due to the availability of data but also
because these networks often constrain the dynamics of interactions from
which new phenomena emerge.
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It is then natural to ask how the dynamics of the minority game are
modified by the presence of a substrate network which represents the ‘social’
network linking the agents. Previous studies have combined the minority
game with regular networks, in one [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] or two [13, 14, 15,
11] dimensions, and with random networks of various types: Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
(or classical) random graphs [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 11, 12], Kaufman Boolean
random networks [21, 22] and scale-free networks [20, 11, 12]. In all cases
the networks are providing a local source of information to the agents which
usually supplements the global information available, namely which choice
formed the minority in previous time steps. The local information can be
implemented in many different ways but here we will just allow agents to
copy the choices made by their nearest neighbours in the substrate network
as used in [8, 16].
In particular an earlier study by Anghel et al. [16] noted that the prob-
ability that an agent is followed by k other agents is roughly proportional
to k−1 when the substrate network is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph. That
is, despite the fact that there is no power law in the degree distribution of
the agents social network, a few leaders naturally emerge from amongst the
agents, 90% of whom are merely ‘followers’. It has been suggested that this
may simply be due to the underlying copying processes, which in the sim-
pler Moran model often leads to a power law of the form k−γ with γ ≤ 1
[23, 24, 25, 26]. It is interesting to note that purely local processes can give
rise to power law behaviour in the degree distribution of growing networks
[27, 28] so such behaviour in a networked minority game is not so surprising.
In this paper we shall investigate two aspects of the leadership structure
found in the networked minority game. First we shall see if the power-law
leadership structure of [16] is robust when we change the substrate network
and secondly, we shall search for a universal characterisation of the emergent
leadership structure and compare this with that found in the Moran model.
2. Model
2.1. The Standard Minority Game
The standard minority game is played by an odd number, N , of agents.
A time step in the game consists of each agent trying to predict which of two
abstract outcomes, A or B, the fewest of its peers will also predict. Once
all agents have chosen, the outcome picked by the fewest agents is deduced
and each of the agents in this minority group is rewarded with a point for
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winning. The game continues in this way for an arbitrary number of time
steps.
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Figure 1: The potential contents of an agent’s brain at an arbitrary time, for the case
where m = 3, S = 2, including the agent’s memory, score and strategies. The highlighted
mapping represents that which would be used if this agent was asked to make a prediction
for the time step.
In order to make a prediction of the next minority outcome, each agent is
equipped with a brain, consisting of a memory with a finite capacity, m, of
past minority outcomes and a set of S strategies mapping possible memory
contents to predictions. Each strategy in the set has an associated score which
represents the number of times that strategy would have predicted correctly
in the past time steps. At the start of the game, the agent memories are
each initialised to the same random string of past minority outcomes. When
an agent must make a prediction, it selects the best performing strategy,
based on score, from the set and uses the outcome prediction mapped by
the current contents of its memory. If more than one strategy has the same
score, the strategy used is chosen randomly from this subset with uniform
probability. At the end of each time step, each agent updates the contents
of its brain to reflect the outcome of the time step, by incrementing its score
if it predicted correctly and updating the contents of its memory. Figure 1
depicts the possible contents of an agent’s brain at an arbitrary time step.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, for a memory capacity of m = 3, each strategy
contains 23 = 8 mappings. In general, for a memory capacity, m, there are
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2m possible permutations of A and B and thus 2m mappings in the strategy.
Since each possible memory string can independently map to either A or
B, the total number of distinct strategies for a memory capacity, m, is 22
m
[3]. The set of all possible strategies for a memory capacity, m is called the
strategy space. At the start of the game, each agent is provided with S
strategies at random from this strategy space. The size of the strategy space
relative to the number of agents in the game is important in characterising
the game dynamics.
2.1.1. The Networked Minority Game
In the standard minority game, each agent is equipped with access to the
same global information as all of its peers in the form of a fixed capacity
memory of past minority outcomes. In this way, agent behaviour (‘intelli-
gence’) can only be varied by varying the memory capacity or by changing
number of strategies an agent has for acting on this memory.
The networked minority game aims to provide each agent with further
local information in terms of access to a subset of the other agent’s predic-
tions. This effectively provides each agent with a neighbourhood with which
it can communicate, providing a much broader range of agent intelligence in
the game. In order to achieve this, each agent is considered as a vertex in
a social network with the edges between them representing communication
channels. We will refer to this network as the substrate network. In our work
this is taken to be a simple graph (no edge weights or self-loops) and we
denote the degree of vertices in this network as ks.
In this regime, a time step initially progresses in a similar way to the stan-
dard minority game in that an agent predicts the minority outcome for that
time step using its personal strategies and the global past minority outcome
information. Rather than using this prediction as the final decision for the
time step, the agent publicises it to each of its friends in its neighbourhood
of the substrate network.
Once all agents have publicised their predictions, the agent can make
its final decision by following the prediction of the friend that has predicted
correctly most frequently in past time steps. Thus, each agent must also keep
track of how often its predictions were correct. If more than one friend scores
equally and highest of all friends in terms of correct predictions, one friend
is chosen from this subset at random with uniform probability. If the agent
itself has predicted correctly most frequently, it follows its own prediction.
Note, it is important to differentiate between a prediction and a final
4
ID7
score12
correct prediction count9
memory, capacity, mA A B
predictionA
decisionB
best friend id6
friend ids5 6 8 10
BB B B
BB B A
AB A B
AB A A
AA B B
BA B A
AA A B
BA A A
7 score
strategy 2
BB B B
AB B A
BB A B
BB A A
BA B B
AA B A
AA A B
AA A A
8 score
strategy 1
Figure 2: The potential contents of a networked agent’s brain for m = 3, S = 2. In
comparison to Figure 1, the networked agent’s brain maintains an ID, a correct prediction
count and has separate stores for the current prediction and decision. The agent’s brain
also has access to a list of the IDs of the agent’s friends and maintains a record of the most
recently followed or best friend’s ID. This is used in constructing the influence network.
The yellow highlighting indicates the source of the prediction whilst the green highlighting
indicates the source of the decision.
decision. The convention adopted here is that a prediction is deduced from
an agent’s strategies whereas a final decision is deduced from the predictions
of nearest neighbour friends. Separate scores are maintained for the number
of times an agent’s prediction has been correct and the number of times an
agent’s final decision has been correct. Our procedure is identical to that
of [16] but we note that allowing agents to follow strategies of non-nearest
neighbours (they copy the decisions not the predictions of nearest neighbours)
is an alternative approach used in [11, 31].
Figure 2 shows how the brain of an agent in the networked game differs
to that of an agent in the standard game.
The decisions made then define a second network, which we will call the
influence network. This is a directed subgraph of the substrate network
in which the directed edges represent one agent following the prediction of
another. The out-degree of vertices is always one. It is the in-degree of
vertices in this influence network which indicates the number of followers
each agent has. We will simply denote this degree as k with pdf p(k) (and
n(k) = Np(k)). Each agent has two non-trivial degrees, one from each
network with k < ks, and Figure 3 demonstrates the difference between
these networks through an example.
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Figure 3: (a) An example substrate network for the case where N = 11. (b) A possible
influence network at some arbitrary time for the substrate network given in (a); an arrow
from agent i to agent j means agent i is following agent j’s prediction for this time-step; a
disconnected agent such as agent 1 is following its own prediction. The highlighted vertex,
numbered 7, corresponds to the agent with brain depicted in Figure 2 and has degrees
ks = 3 from the substrate network and k = 2 from the influence network.
Observables studied in the standard minority game, such as choice atten-
dance, variance and wealth (see for example [29, 1, 30]), are just as relevant
in the networked minority game. Here, however, we will focus only on fea-
tures relevant in the presence of a network. In particular, following Anghel
et al. [16]1 we will look for a power law in the degree distribution of the
influence network as this hints at some self-organisation amongst the agents
in the game.
3. Method
3.1. Measurement Requirements
Since the initial contents of the agent memories is chosen at random, it is
necessary to allow the game to run for some number of settling time steps so
that it stabilises. Here a settling time of 100× 2m was used since this value
was found to be sufficient in previous work [30].
In addition to the disorder in the memory contents, there is also disorder
present in the strategies in use in the game since each execution may involve
different strategies from the strategy space. Similarly when generating influ-
ence network data sets, since the substrate networks each involve an element
of randomness, it is possible that the equilibrium reached will vary. Thus it
is important to average over these differences to find the equilibrium state
1Some related work has also been conducted by others, for instance, see [31].
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of the game in each case. Two different averages were used throughout: a
time average where quantities were averaged over time steps and an ensemble
average where quantities were averaged over distinct executions of the game
with the same parameters.
Separately, the influence network is a function of time and so to find the
correct influence network degree distribution, an average must be taken over
many time steps. Since not all agents will change their leader, there is likely
to be correlation in the influence network between subsequent time steps. It
was deduced, through a comparison with past results, that a time difference
between influence network measurements of 100 time steps was sufficient.
3.2. Generation of Influence Network Degree Distributions
The most important measurable in later sections is the in-degree distribu-
tion of the influence network, p(k), formed between the agents in the game.
The following details the way in which the model is used to generate this
influence network degree distribution:
1. Construct a game using a substrate network of the required type and
with the required parameters,
2. Perform a number of time steps equal to the required settling time,
3. For the number of influence networks over which the degree distribution
should be time averaged:
(a) Generate the influence network using the best friend information
stored by each agent,
(b) Store the degree distribution for that influence network,
(c) Iterate a number of time steps equal to the required influence
network measurement spacing,
4. Find and store the time average of the influence network degree distri-
bution,
5. Repeat for as many runs required for the ensemble average.
3.3. Graph Algorithms
Three different substrate networks were used: Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph
(random or ER for short), a scale-free network (SF) and a regular-ring (Ring)
network representing a wide range of different degree distributions.
The random graph substrate was an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph. Here all
N(N−1)/2 agent pairs are considered and an edge is added with probability
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p where 〈ks〉 = p(N − 1) is the desired average degree in the substrate net-
work. The scale-free graph is created using the JUNG library generator [32]
which generates networks with a k−3
s
power law degree distribution using the
preferential attachment algorithm of [4]. Finally for the regular ring network,
the N vertices are placed on a ring and then each vertex is connected to the
next 〈ks〉/2 vertices in each direction around the ring.
4. Results and Observations
Our computational model was checked in two ways. Firstly we reproduced
the standard minority game for the normalised variance in choice attendance,
σ2
N
, as a function of memory capacity, m, number of agents, N , and number
of strategies per agent, S [3]. Figure 9 given in the appendix shows our
plot. In light of these results, we decided to use two strategies, S = 2, and
a memory capacity of six, m = 6, so as to produce a low normalised variance
in choice attendance in the standard minority game.
The presence of the substrate network will alter the relationship between
m, S and the behaviour of the Minority game, e.g. the normalised variance
in choice attendance [12]. As we are interested in studying and extending
the results of [16] on leadership structures, and given the majority of results
in [16] are for S = 2 and m = 6, we only work with these values. Our focus
is on the variation of the substrate network parameters.
In a similar way, the networked minority game was verified by generating
data to plot the influence network degree distribution given in Figure 1a of
[16]. Our results, shown in Figure 4, compare very well.
As can be seen in Figure 4, the power-law nature of the influence network
has been confirmed. This occurs despite the substrate network being random.
Anghel et al. [16] deduced that this occurs because those agents that predict
correctly most often are more likely to be followed, generating a power-law
influence network in a way similar to the Moran model [23, 24, 25, 26].
What still remains unexplained is the cutoff point in the degree distribu-
tion after which it decays very quickly. Further, the emergence of a scale-free
influence network has only been confirmed for a random substrate network.
In an attempt to provide a more complete understanding of the influence
network structure, the following sections perform further analysis on the in-
fluence network degree distribution for a random substrate network as well
as investigating the effect of using various different substrate networks.
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Figure 4: Influence network degree distribution for a random substrate network as a
function of N and p. Each data set was generated for m = 6, S = 2 with a settling time
of 100000 time steps, time averaged over 1000 influence networks each spaced by 100 time
steps and ensemble averaged over 20 realisations of the game. The number of agents with
zero followers has been excluded from the graph and the distribution has been normalised
by the number of agents with one follower. The standard error in each data point is in all
cases smaller than the data point itself.
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ER Random
substrate
p(k) = A(k + k1)
−γ(1 + k
k2
)−χ
N 〈ks〉 p k1 k2 χ γ ln(a)
201 20.1 0.10 0.5±1.2 20.9±0.5 15.0±0.6 1.2±0.3 2.3±0.3
201 39.8 0.20 0.5±0.6 41.5±0.4 19.7±0.6 1.1±0.1 1.5±0.2
601 60.1 0.10 0.5±0.5 61.5±0.4 21.1±0.5 1.08±0.07 2.1±0.2
601 120.0 0.20 0.5±0.4 125.1±0.5 29.7±0.9 1.05±0.04 1.4±0.2
1001 100.1 0.10 0.4±0.3 103.2±0.4 26.4±0.5 1.05±0.03 2.1±0.1
Scale Free
substrate
p(k) = A(k + k1)
−γ(1 + k
k2
)−χ
N 〈ks〉 p k1 k2 χ γ ln(a)
201 20.8 0.10 0.5±1.4 14.8±0.7 6.5±0.3 1.1±0.4 2.5±0.3
201 42.3 0.21 0.5±1.0 34.4±1.4 6.3±0.2 1.1±0.2 1.6±0.3
401 86.0 0.22 -0.4±0.4 60.8±1.7 5.8±0.1 0.87±0.08 1.8±0.3
601 62.4 0.10 -0.3±0.5 40.6±1.3 6.0±0.1 0.87±0.12 2.6±0.3
601 129.8 0.22 -0.5±0.3 91.0±2.0 5.7±0.1 0.87±0.06 1.8±0.3
1001 104.0 0.10 -0.4±0.3 68.0±1.4 5.8±0.1 0.89±0.07 2.6±0.3
Ring
substrate
p(k) = A(k + k1)
−γ exp{−( k
k2
)χ}
N 〈ks〉 p k1 k2 χ γ ln(A)
201 20 0.1 0.5±1.1 14.0±1.3 2.4±0.3 0.5±0.2 1.7±0.4
201 40 0.2 0.5±0.8 26.0±1.5 2.2±0.2 0.43±0.11 0.6±0.2
401 40 0.1 0.5±0.7 47.7±2.2 2.0±0.1 0.35±0.06 0.1±0.2
601 60 0.1 0.5±0.8 39.4±2.0 2.1±0.2 0.36±0.08 0.8±0.2
601 120 0.2 0.5±0.6 75.7±2.4 2.1±0.1 0.36±0.04 -0.3±0.1
Table 1: Fit functions and parameters with standard errors for the influence network
degree distributions arising from random, scale-free and regular-ring substrate networks.
Note that for double power law the normalisation A is given in terms of a = A(1 +
k1)
−γ(1 + 1
k2
)−χ.
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4.1. Random Substrate Network
Given the hypothesis that the local copying process seen in the Moran
model explains the influence network structure for a random substrate net-
work, each of the data sets shown in Figure 4 was fitted to the function
p(k) ∼ k−γe−αk of the Moran model [23, 24, 25, 26]. Unfortunately, the fits
were unsuccessful because of the tail. Through trial and error, the influence
structure was found to better fit a function with a faster power law cutoff,
p(k) = A(k + k1)
−γ
(
1 +
(
k
k2
)χ)
(1)
where A, k1, k2, γ and χ are parameters to be found. The resulting fit pa-
rameters for each of the random substrate network parameter sets, (N, 〈ks〉),
are shown together with their associated errors in Table 1. Note that this
confirms the suggestion made in [16] that the initial fall off is power law with
a power γ ≈ 1.0. Figure 5 shows the influence network degree probability
distribution in log space with the functional fits superimposed.
4.2. Scale-Free Substrate Network
To investigate the effect of having a much larger maximum degree and
a broad degree distribution, the next substrate network investigated was a
scale-free network. Figure 5 shows the resulting influence structure for similar
parameter sets, (N, 〈ks〉), as those used in the random network case. Again
the data was fitted to various forms but the best fit was also found with the
double power law form of (1) used for the random case above. Table 1 gives
the best fit parameters and associated errors. The initial scale-free leadership
structure is still present, again with power γ ≈ 1. However comparing the
data for random and scale-free substrate cases, Figure 5 shows the latter has
a much sharper turnover and the fit is relatively poor for a few values at this
transition. Nevertheless the double power law form (1) still provides a good
description of the results.
4.3. Regular-Ring Substrate Network
Finally we look at a regular substrate network with much more local
structure and no variation in degree compared to the previous two substrate
types. The influence structure for the regular-ring substrate network has
isolated peaks at 〈ks〉 and
〈ks〉
2
. If we ignore these extraneous points, the
remaining data is similar in shape as before but now the turnover from power
11
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Figure 5: Normalised influence network degree distributions for random (ER), scale-free
(SF) and regular-ring (Ring) substrate networks. Each data set was generated for m = 6,
S = 2 with a settling time of 100000 time steps, time averaged over 1000 influence networks
separated by 100 time steps each and ensemble averaged over 20 realisations of the game.
The standard error for each data point is not shown since it is smaller than the point itself
in all cases. The lines are the best fits using the forms given in Table 1.
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law to exponential decay is much more gradual than in the random and scale-
free cases with no visually recognisable cutoff point. In this case we find that
if we exclude the isolated peaks, the remaining points are best fit with an
exponential cutoff
p(k) = A(k + k1)
−γ exp {−(k/k2)
χ} (2)
with the best fit parameters and associated errors given in Table 1. Since
χ is significantly different from 1.0 the tail is still different from that in the
Moran model, just as for the last two types of substrate network. However
while we still find the same scale-free leadership structure as before, it is now
much less fat with γ ≈ 0.4. Again, the resulting curves are superimposed on
the data in Figure 5.
4.4. Data Collapse
By looking at the fitted parameters it is clear that in all cases the k1 pa-
rameter is marginal and can be dropped (set to zero) without any significant
loss of precision. The key features in all cases are an initial power law drop
in p(k), with power set by γ, followed by a sharp cutoff setting in at about
k2.
Table 2 presents the main network characteristics for each of the sub-
strate network types. Using this data it is possible to plot each of the fit
parameters given in Table 1 against each of the network characteristics in
an attempt to find a relationship. The regular ring graph has a γ which is
markedly different from the other two substrate networks but otherwise γ
shows no strong dependence on the network parameters. However there is a
clear linear dependence of the cutoff scale k2 on the average degree of the sub-
strate network 〈ks〉 as Figure 6 shows. The coefficients do differ significantly
between networks however and we find that
krandom
2
= 1.038(8)〈ks〉 − 0.2(6) (3)
kscale-free
2
= 0.67(4)〈ks〉+ 2(3) (4)
kregular-ring
2
= 0.61(2)〈ks〉+ 2(2) , (5)
where the brackets give the standard errors in the last digit. Note that a zero
intercept is consistent here but what is important is that the cutoff scale k2
is a linear function of 〈ks〉 in each case.
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Type N 〈ks〉 p ks,min ks,max d 〈l〉 〈c〉
201 20.1 0.10 9.3 33.7 3 2.0 0.10
201 39.8 0.20 25.0 56.4 3 1.8 0.20
ER 601 60.1 0.10 36.7 85.5 3 1.9 0.10
601 120.0 0.20 90.2 151.0 2 1.8 0.20
1001 100.1 0.10 70.8 132.8 3 1.9 0.10
201 20.8 0.10 10.0 75.4 3 2.0 0.18
201 42.3 0.21 21.1 114.3 3 1.8 0.31
SF 401 86.0 0.22 45.6 228.9 2.45 1.8 0.31
601 62.4 0.10 32.5 240.9 3 1.9 0.18
601 129.8 0.22 71.9 344.2 2 1.8 0.31
1001 104.0 0.10 54.9 388.4 3 1.9 0.18
201 20 0.1 20 20 10 5.5 0.71
201 40 0.2 40 40 5 3.0 0.73
Ring 601 60 0.1 60 60 10 5.5 0.74
601 120 0.2 120 120 5 3.0 0.74
1001 100 0.1 100 100 10 5.5 0.74
Table 2: Properties of the substrate network for the relevant parameter sets, (N, 〈k〉), for
random (ER), scale-free (SF) and regular-ring (Ring) networks. Here p = 〈ks〉/(N − 1),
ks,min and ks,max are minimum and maximum degree, d is the diameter, 〈l〉 the average
shortest path between vertex paths and 〈c〉 is the average clustering coefficient. In each
case, the quantities were averaged over 20 realisations of the corresponding graph.
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Figure 6: Plots of the fit parameter, k2, against average degree, 〈k〉, for each of the random
(black circles and solid line), scale-free (red triangles and dashed line) and regular-ring
(blue plus and dotted line) substrate networks. The lines are the best linear fits. In each
case, the standard errors are smaller than the data point and so are not shown.
This now suggests how we can summarise our results. The leadership
distributions found can be well approximated by a power law section followed
by essentially nothing,
p(k) =


p(0) if k = 0
Ak−γ if 0 < k ≤ k2
0 if k > k2
. (6)
We have two constraints, that
∑
k p(k) = 1 and
∑
k kp(k) = 〈k〉 ≈ 1 since
for the influence network most vertices point to a single leader, while a few
do not. Approximating these sums as an integral gives us simple expressions
for the two unknowns A and p(0)
A =
〈k〉(2− γ)
k2−γ
2
− 1
, p(0) = 1−
A
1− γ
(k1−γ
2
− 1) . (7)
In terms of the parameter p = 〈ks〉/(N − 1), it was noted empirically in
[16] that n(1) = Np(1) = 1
cp
with c a constant independent of p (equivalently
〈ks〉) and N . Within our approximations we have that
c ≈
(k2−γ
2
− 1)
〈ks〉〈k〉(2− γ)
(N − 1)
N
(8)
15
For our examples, k2, N ≫ 1 are good approximations. For the random
and scale-free graphs (but not for the regular ring graphs) the approxi-
mation γ ≈ 1 is weaker but acceptable in most cases. This then leaves
c = (k2/〈ks〉)(1/〈k〉). The first term is approximately constant for all net-
works though the value does depend on the type of network as shown in (5).
It is not surprising that 〈k〉 is close to one since in the influence network
each agent can follow at most one other agent. So in our language, the result
p = 〈ks〉/(N − 1) of [16] follows if we assume the leadership distribution is
a power law followed by a sharp cutoff at k2 which is proportional to the
average degree of the substrate network 〈ks〉. We have noted exactly this
behaviour for a wider range of networks in Table 1 and Fig. 6.
In terms of data collapse it suggests that we plot y = kp(k).Np against
x = k/k2 since (6) then becomes
y(x) = (2− γ)
N
N − 1
〈ks〉
k2
1
1− kγ−2
2
x1−γ , 0 < x ≤ 1 . (9)
The coefficient should vary only with the type of substrate graph used, it
should be approximately independent of N and 〈ks〉. Replotting the data
used in Figure 6 using the form (9) now gives the satisfying result shown in
Figure 7.
What is clear is that there are relatively minor differences between the
random graphs and the scale free graphs, but that there is a fundamental
change when working with the regular ring graph. To show this more clearly
we plot the data for three different types of graph but with essentially the
same number of vertices and edges using the data collapse function (9). The
result is shown in Figure 8 and emphasises the differences between the dif-
ferent type of graph.
5. Conclusions
We have studied the minority game in which the agents act on a sub-
strate network representing the social network of agents in the market. We
investigated three different types of substrate networks: Erdo˝s-Re´nyi ran-
dom graph, scale-free and regular-ring, chosen to represent various extremes
in terms of their substrate degree distributions, and investigated each using
a variety of network sizes. By fitting the data to various functions we found
two forms gave good fits, (1) and (2), and that the resulting degree distribu-
tion of the influence network may always be characterised as having a power
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Figure 7: Data collapse for the influence network degree distributions for for random (ER),
scale-free (SF) and regular-ring (Ring) substrate networks. The data sets are the same as
used in plotting Figure 6. Again, the standard error is smaller than each data point and
thus is not shown.
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Figure 8: Comparison of collapsed influence network degree distributions. Each plot shows
three different types of substrate network but each has the same number of vertices and
approximately the same number of edges. Top left has N = 601, p ≈ 0.1, top right has
N = 601, p ≈ 0.2 and the bottom plot shows N = 201, p ≈ 0.1. The data sets used are the
corresponding sets for the random (ER), scale-free (SF) and regular-ring (Ring) substrate
network as shown in Figure 6.
law distribution followed by a sharp cutoff. This is best illustrated by re-
plotting our data in terms of the collapse function (9), as shown in Figures 7
and 8 which highlights the universal aspects of the behaviour. In particular
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our form (9) shows how the leadership varies in a universal manner for one
type of substrate network as the number of vertices and edges (equivalently
N and 〈ks〉) changes.
The universal form shows that irrespective of the type of substrate net-
work, the leadership structure which emerges has an initial power law section.
That is, there are always a few agents whose actions are copied by many oth-
ers. In particular we find this power law whether or not the underlying social
network has a scale-free structure, or if it is a regular graph, and thus have
significantly extended the finding of Anghel et al. [16] for the random sub-
strate network. However we have also found that the nature of the social
network linking agents does have a significant effect on the ‘fatness’ of the
leadership distribution, that is the power γ in our parameterisations (1), (2),
(6) or (9). In particular we find that the regular graph does not show the
power of γ ≈ 1 found for the random and scale-free graphs here and noted
for the random graph in [16].
The manner in which this power law in leadership is cutoff has also been
quantified. While the nature of the tail depends on the type of substrate
network, we have shown that the cutoff point is always proportional to the
average degree of the underlying social network.
The minority game is clearly not realistic in many senses but it can cap-
ture some of the basic features of competition dynamics. In the case of the
networked minority game investigated here, it is clear that the copying of
strategies from a local social neighbourhood does lead to the emergence of
a leadership structure, regardless of the nature of the social network. On
the other hand it appears the copying processes represented by the Moran
model [23, 24, 25, 26] are too simple to capture the full detail of the lead-
ership structure emerging in these networked minority games. Nevertheless
the Moran model with its exact analytic results does provide an explanation
as to how a power law in leadership emerges in the networked minority game.
We stress that the functional forms used to fit our results, (1) and (2),
are statistically acceptable but are not the only possible forms which could
be used. We use them to provide a quantitative description of the leadership
structure in the networked Minority game so that we can make quantitative
comparisons for different types of networks and against the Moran model.
We do not derive any particular meaning from the particular functional forms
used other than they describe leaderships structures with an initial power-
law behaviour followed by a sharp cutoff (6). This description is sufficient to
give an excellent data collapse. We have, though, excluded the simple Moran
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form as a good fit.
It would be interesting to change the way the information flows in the
substrate network. In particular both Cajueiro and De Camargo [11] and
Lavicˇka and Slanina [12] allow agents to follow the strategies of non-nearest
neighbours. This is done by allowing agents to copy what we have termed
the decisions of nearest neighbours. Reality is likely to be somewhere in
between, information can flow beyond nearest neighbours, but information on
the decisions of most successful agent is unlikely to be transmitted perfectly
over several steps in the substrate network. It would be interesting to revisit
the different questions raised here and in [16, 11, 12] for these more realistic
information flows.
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Supplementary Material
This supplementary material is not part of the published paper.
A1. Obtaining the Source Code
All source code has been released open source under the MIT license and is
available to view online at http://www.github.com/tobyclemson/msci-project
via the github online source code repository. Alternatively, to download a
complete working copy of the repository, the git version control tool is re-
quired, available from http://git-scm.com/.
To clone the source code repository, execute the following at the command
line of a computer with git installed:
> git clone git://github.com/tobyclemson/msci-project.git
target directory
where target directory is the name of the directory you want the source
code downloaded to.
Once the repository has been cloned, a number of directories are available:
> tree -ad -L 1
.
|-- .git
|-- features
|-- lib
|-- nbproject
|-- spec
|-- src
`-- vendor
The .git directory contains a complete copy of the source code repository
including every version ever committed using the git version control system.
A good introduction on using git can be found at http://progit.org/book/.
The src directory contains all Java source files for the minority game model.
The spec and features directories contain the unit and acceptance tests re-
spectively, written using Ruby. The vendor directory contains all third party
libraries used during development of the computational model. The lib di-
rectory contains some Ruby scripts that aided in testing the Java code base.
Finally, the nbproject directory contains NetBeans specific files allowing the
code to be imported into the NetBeans IDE.
For further details on the computational model, refer to A3.
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A2. Computational Model
Here a very brief overview of the computational methods used in generat-
ing all data presented in Section 4 is given. The full source code is available
online as detailed in A1. For a more thorough technical coverage of the
computational model, see A3.
A2.1. Implementation
Early on, it was decided that Java would be used as the main language for
the computational model since it is easier and less error prone to develop with
than C/C++. This ease of development comes at the cost of performance
but it was felt that this would not be a problem since Java is already widely
used in the scientific community [34].
Java has numerous other benefits: it is portable allowing the code to be
run on a wide variety of platforms, it has a very large base of existing libraries
both standard to Java and developed by third parties and it is very widely
used meaning that much help is available from online communities.
The Ruby scripting language was also used in developing the compu-
tational model to aid in testing, prototyping and experimenting with the
Java code base. This was made possible using a Ruby implementation called
JRuby which allows the two languages to work together.
To reduce the time spent developing the computational model, it was
decided that custom code should only be written for the core minority game
behaviour utilising existing libraries for everything else. The external li-
braries used were all very mature in their development and as a result, well
tested and mostly bug free.
The graph data structures and algorithms necessary for the networked
minority game code were provided by the Java Universal Network/Graph
Framework (JUNG) [32] which is full featured, fast and flexible. The li-
brary is capable of constructing and manipulating graphs of any sort. It also
provides functionality to calculate various graph properties.
The random number generator used was taken from the CERN Colt sci-
entific library [35].
All statistical analysis was automated by the model in two ways. Firstly,
many statistical quantities such as means, variances or standard errors were
calculated inside the simulation using the classes available in the CERN Colt
scientific library [35]. Secondly, when further processing was required on
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the generated data, it was exported to Excel spreadsheets complete with all
required formulae. This was made possible by the Apache POI library.
One major benefit of performing analysis inside the simulation was that
the algorithms used could be programmatically tested reducing the possibility
of human error.
An incremental approach was used in the development, and so it was
important to make the code as modular and extensible as possible and so a
fully object oriented approach was adopted utilising a number of tried and
tested design patterns. Full details of the design of the model are given in
[33].
A2.2. Testing and Verification
The code base itself was tested using automated tests written in Ruby.
Besides detecting bugs in the software, utilising automated tests helped to
identify breakages as new functionality was added to the system. Thus,
even though the tests took time to write, they saved much time in terms of
debugging and development.
Whilst automated testing ensured the software worked as expected, it did
not verify any assumptions made about the rules of the minority game. To
verify the model constructed worked in the same way as those used by past
researchers, it was necessary to generate some previously established results
and compare the resulting plots. To do this, the graphs in Figures 9 and 4
were generated and compared and as is shown in Section 4, this verified the
model was indeed producing the same results.
Another aspect that caused problems was when choosing between strate-
gies or friends that had identical scores. The algorithm employed was at first
incorrect since it did not return each such entity with uniform probability if
there were more than two with the same score. This problem was discovered
using statistical unit testing and was solved by rewriting the algorithm.
A2.3. Optimisation
As each component of the system was completed, preliminary simulation
runs were executed in an attempt to gauge the time requirements for data
generation. The preliminary runs for the networked game indicated that it
would take in excess of 8 days to generate a data set comparable to that in
the paper from Anghel et al. [16]. This execution time was despite running
the simulation on a multicore server with ample memory.
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The optimisation was performed by attaching a profiler to an example
simulation run which could intercept and log method calls and requests for
memory at well as perform temporal benchmarking. This made it possible
to see which parts of the model were most CPU and memory intensive or
took the longest time to run. Further, those parts could then be rewritten
so that they performed in a more suitable time.
After all optimisations had been performed, the time taken to generate
an influence network degree distribution had dropped to less than 4 days and
further profiling indicated that the only remaining bottlenecks in the code
were due to the third party libraries being used.
A2.4. Optimisation
For the standard minority game with no network, we studied the nor-
malised variance in choice attendance, σ
2
N
, as a function of memory capacity,
m, number of agents, N , and number of strategies per agent, S. Figure 9
shows the resulting plot and comparing to [3]. As required, the minimum
variance occurs for S = 2 and 2
m
N
= 0.4. Note that this graph was generated
for m = 7 and the variances were recorded after a settling time of 100× 2m
time steps and ensemble averaged over 100 realisations of the game.
As can be seen from Figure 9, the optimum values of S, m and N are
given by Soptimal = 2 and zoptimal =
2
m
N
= 0.4. Thus, having more than 2
strategies does not benefit the agents as a collective. Similarly, the optimum
memory capacity, moptimal is dependent on the number of agents in the game,
N .
Referring back to Section 2.1, it is clear the quantity 2m is related to the
size of the strategy space. In fact, it can be shown the strategies in a strategy
space for a memory capacity m are not all independent with the number of
independent strategies being 2m [37]. So the quantity, 2
m
N
, represents the
ratio of independent strategies to the number of agents. For small N , only
a fraction of the independent strategy space is spanned and the agents do
not have enough collective intelligence to work together, instead acting more
like random choice agents. As N increases such that it is comparable to the
number of independent strategies, a minimum is observed where the agents
can cooperate efficiently. As N continues to increase above the number of
independent strategies, herding occurs wherein more than one agent has each
independent strategy which is detrimental to the game [3].
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Figure 9: σ
2
N
for the standard minority game as a function of S, N and m. The plot shows
data points for S = 2, 3 and 4 from bottom left to top right respectively. The key quantity
here is z = 2
m
N
. As the plot shows, the minimum variance occurs for S = 2, z ≈ 0.4.
The simulation was run with a fixed memory capacity, m = 7, allowing a settle time of
100× 2m = 12800 time steps. The variance for each N was time averaged over 10000 time
steps and ensemble averaged over 100 realisations of the game. The standard error in each
data point is in all cases smaller than the data point itself.
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A3. Architecture of the Computational Model
This Appendix provides the more technical details of the design, im-
plementation, testing and optimisation of the computational model used
throughout the project.
A3.1. Design
An object oriented design was used throughout. An inheritance hierarchy
was built for the agent classes since each of the agents shared some common
traits. Agent classes were implemented for random choice agents, basic agents
that used only global information and networked agents that utilised the
substrate network. The most important classes in the system are given in
the following list:
MinorityGame: The MinorityGame class is a controller for the minority
game simulation. It provides methods to take a time step, determine
the minority outcome and minority size as well as methods to access all
other entities in the simulation such as agents, strategies, the substrate
network etc.
Agent: The Agent interface declares a number of methods that implement-
ing classes must include to qualify as agents. The interface provides
methods to ask an agent to prepare to make a decision, choose an out-
come and update based on the minority choice as well as methods to
handle agent identification, scores, predictions and decisions.
BasicAgent: The BasicAgent class implemented the agent interface and
made its decision for each time step using a brain only, i.e., it only
made use of global information.
NetworkedAgent: The NetworkedAgent class implemented the agent inter-
face and made its decision using the predictions of the other agents
with which it could communicate via the substrate network. The class
also provides access to the agent’s best friend at any point in time.
Friendship: The Friendship class represents a friendship existing between
two agents and is used in the social network to represent an edge.
ChoiceMemory: The ChoiceMemory class implemented the memory func-
tionality allowing past minority choices to be added and memory con-
tents to be read. The memory worked like a fixed size pipe, the most
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recent minority choices are pushed in at the front and the oldest are
pushed out and discarded from the back.
Strategy: The Strategy class encapsulated the intelligence aspect of an
agents brain as a mapping between possible memory contents and pre-
dictions.
StrategyManager: The StrategyManager class manages an agent’s strate-
gies providing the ability to fetch the best performing strategy and
update all strategies based on the past minority choice.
Community: The Community class represents the entire community of agents
along with the friendships between them containing the social network
and providing access to everything inside the social network.
Neighbourhood: The Neighbourhood class represents an agent’s local neigh-
bourhood of friends giving access to the best performing friend and all
other local information available to the agents.
By using classes to represent the memory, strategies and community, and
local neighbourhood of agents it is very easy to switch in and out different
functionality. This is an example of the Strategy pattern. The Agent inter-
face is actually a super-interface containing a number of smaller interfaces
determining individual agent traits which can be implemented separately to
give different types of agents. This is an example of the Facade pattern.
Abstract classes have also been used in a number of places implementing the
core functionality of an interface so that subclasses don’t have do implement
quite so many methods. For further details on these design patterns see
Gamma et al. [38].
The minority game itself is composed of numerous entities such as agents,
strategies, memories, scores, friendships etc. Each of the required simulations
will use agents that choose in different ways or networks that are built in
different ways etc. As such the construction of a minority game instance was
abstracted away from the minority game itself into a number of factory classes
that build the object hierarchy required by a single instance of the game.
This allows many different game types to be created by simply changing
the factories used. This is known as the Abstract Factory pattern which
decouples object behaviour from object creation.
In terms of the data collection aspect of the code it was hoped that there
would be time to implement the Observer pattern which allows different
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objects to register with another object to be notified when certain changes
occur. In this way it would have been possible to attach data collectors to the
minority game itself which would have been notified at the end of each time
step and passed the minority game itself to update their local data stores.
These data contained could then be passed to data analysers to perform all
required analysis. Unfortunately there wasn’t time to implement this so all
data collection was performed inside the simulation harness that ran each
simulation. This could be implemented in future.
A3.2. Implementation
The computational model was implemented using Java.2 The advantages
and disadvantages of Java are weighed up in the following listing:
A3.2.1. Advantages
• Java avoids many of the low level aspects of languages such as C and
C++ such as manual memory management and pointer based memory
addressing, making it very easy and fast to develop with.
• Java also has a very complete standard library of classes as well as
many high quality third party open source libraries.
• Java has many users worldwide so there is a good support network.
• Specific to this project, there are a lot of graph theory related libraries
available for Java.
A3.2.2. Disadvantages
• Java is interpreted to an extent; the source code is compiled to an
intermediate stage called bytecode which is interpreted on a virtual
machine, thus making it slightly less efficient than C/C++.
A number of external libraries were used to speed up development. These
are mature projects that are very well tried and tested. The following list
details which aspects of the system they were used for:
2Available from: http://java.sun.com [Accessed: 21st April 2010].
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Java Universal Network/Graph Framework (JUNG) Rather than imple-
ment custom graph classes to represent the networks required, it made
sense to use an existing library which was feature complete and well
tested. The JUNG library offers a collection of interfaces as well as de-
fault implementations of a wide variety of graph data structures as well
as algorithms for constructing and operating on those graphs.3 The de-
fault implementations were more than suitable for the purposes of the
minority game and by using this package much development time was
saved.
CERN Colt A number of issues were encountered with the random number
generators included with the Java standard library. As a result, the
more complete random number generation classes from the Colt library
from CERN were employed which proved far more consistent than the
built-in alternatives.4
The Colt library also contains a number of very useful statistical bin
classes that automatically calculate a number of different statistical
quantities for the data that they store. This allowed much of the data
processing to occur inside the simulation itself.
Apache POI The Apache POI library provides an Application Program-
ming Interface (API) allowing Microsoft Excel documents to be cre-
ated programmatically.5 Using this API it was possible to further au-
tomate the required data processing by automatically generating Excel
spreadsheets containing all of the data for a particular run, complete
with formulae to calculate errors and averages. After performing a run
of the model, all that remained was for plots to be created manually
inside the excel spreadsheet and for functional fits to be made to the
resulting degree distributions as described in Section 4.
3Available from: http://jung.sourceforge.net/ [Accessed: 21st April 2010].
4Available from: http://acs.lbl.gov/ hoschek/colt/ [Accessed: 21st April 2010].
5Available from: http://poi.apache.org/ [Accessed: 21st April 2010].
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A3.3. Testing
All testing was performed using the Ruby scripting language.6 This was
realised by using a Ruby7 implementation called JRuby8 which allows Java
and Ruby to operate alongside each other and have access to each others
functionality.
When developing the code base, test driven development was used as
much as possible. This is a development practice where automated tests
are written before the code under test. In this way, the tests act like a
specification for the codebase and writing what you want the code to do
before you write the code helps you to design the resulting code from the
point of view of a client of that code.
The testing libraries that facilitated this style of development are RSpec9
and Cucumber10, which test different aspects of the software.
RSpec tests the code at unit level which corresponds to one set of tests
per class. In this way, the behaviour of the class can be verified in isolation
from the rest of the code base. A number of different types of unit tests were
used:
State based: ensuring that given a particular input, a method on an object
of the class in a particular state produces the correct output.
Interaction based: ensuring that a method on a class calls a method on one
of its dependencies.
Performance based: ensuring a method executes within some time frame.
Statistics based: ensuring that probabilistic algorithms performed correctly
based on the statistics of random variables.
In contrast, Cucumber allows acceptance tests to be written which verify
that all classes work together correctly at the level of the entire model. These
functional tests ensure that the distinct entities in the system produce the
desired results at the scale of the entire system.
6Available from: http://www.ruby-lang.org/en/ [Accessed: 21st April 2010].
7Available from: http://www.ruby-lang.org/en/ [Accessed: 21st April 2010].
8Available from: http://jruby.org [Accessed: 21st April 2010].
9Available from: http://rspec.info/ [Accessed: 22nd April 2010].
10Available from: http://cukes.info/ [Accessed: 22nd April 2010]
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A3.4. Optimisation
All optimisation was performed using the NetBeans IDE.11 This allow
the code to be profiled by attaching a profiler that gives detailed and real
time benchmarking data on the number of method calls made to particular
methods, the CPU time occupied by each part of the system, the memory
consumption and the time taken by each part of the simulation. This in turn
allowed the code to be refactored by optimising at the method level cutting
execution time by over 50% in many cases.
11Available from: http://netbeans.org/ [Accessed: 22nd April 2010].
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